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CUSTOMS LAW - A BRIEF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION
by
Theo B. Audett*
I. BACKGROUND AND JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS COURT
The United States Customs Court was created by act of Congress in 1926.'
It is composed of nine judges, not more than five of whom may be from the
same political party, appointed for life by the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. One of the judges is designated by the President to
act as chief judge.' The Customs Court was included in the judicial code in
1940 and became a part of the judiciary of the United States.!
Although the office of the court and the official station of the judges is at
New York City,4 the chief judge may designate a judge or judges to proceed
to any port, or to any place within the jurisdiction of the United States, to
preside at a trial or hearing.' Normal procedure is for customs cases to be
heard at the port of entry. A recent amendment to the law also permits the
chief judge, upon application of a party or upon his own initiative, and upon
a showing that the interests of economy, efficiency, and justice will be served,
to issue an order authorizing a judge of the court to preside in an evidentiary
hearing in a foreign country whose laws permit such a hearing.' An inter-
locutory appeal may be taken from such an' order, subject to the discretion
of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, as further discussed below.7
The Customs Court, in general, has exclusive jurisdiction over all civil ac-
tions instituted to contest administrative decisions by customs officers with
respect to imported merchandise. These include all charges of whatever
character within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the exclusion
of merchandise from entry or delivery, refusal to pay drawback claims, and
refusal to reliquidate customs entries to correct alleged errors.' A substantial
majority of the cases heard by the Customs Court involve either the appraised
value of imported merchandise or the applicable rate of duty.
The burden of proof in customs cases rests upon the party challenging the
official action.9 This burden, in cases involving appraisement or classification
(rate of duty), has been held to be twofold. The plaintiff must not only
establish that the value or rate of duty found by Customs is erroneous, but
must also establish the correct value or rate of duty; otherwise the determina-
tion by Customs, even though erroneous, must stand.' As is further discussed
0J.D., University of Washington. Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, California; formerly
Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Customs.
'Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, §§ 1, 2, 44 Stat. 669, as amended, 28 U.S.C. 1581
(1964), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1582 (Supp. 1971).
228 U.S.C. § 251 (1964).
'Act of Oct. 10, 1940, ch. 843, § 1, 54 Stat. 1101, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1964).
428 U.S.C. 5 251 (1964).
528 U.S.C.A. § 256 (Supp. 1971).6 Id. § 256(b), amending 28 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp. V, 1970).
7Id.
828 U.S.C.A. § 1582 (Supp. 1971).
0 1d. § 2635.
"0Kobe Import Co. v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 194, 198 (1955); W.T. Grant Co. v.
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below in the sections relating to appraisement and classification, the technical
nature of tariff laws makes this burden a most difficult one.
Customs litigation normally originates with a protest by an importer.11
However, an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler may also con-
test the classification or appraised value of any imported merchandise of a
class or kind manufactured, produced, or sold at wholesale by him.12
Actions involving imported merchandise which are not within the jurisdic-
tion of the Customs Court include: (1) criminal or civil actions brought by
the United States against importers or others involving criminal or enforce-
ment provisions of the tariff laws; (2) forfeiture proceedings against imported
merchandise, or proceedings to recover the domestic value thereof, based upon
false or fraudulent statements in connection with the customs entry, or other
acts or omissions of importers or others whereby the United States is or may
be deprived of lawful duties, or involving merchandise the importation of
which is prohibited." Such actions fall within the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts and are usually instituted by the United States Attorney
in the districts in which they arise, upon the basis of information submitted
by principal customs officers or by the Secretary of the Treasury.14
All hearings are normally before a single judge of the Customs Court, whose
decision is final unless appealed within sixty days to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals." Interlocutory orders issued by a judge of the Customs Court
may also be appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, subject to
the discretion of that court, if the judge issuing the order includes a statement
that a controlling question of law is involved as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion, and that an immediate appeal may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."6 Such application must be
made to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals within ten days after the
entry of the order." A similar right of appeal exists with respect to an order
by the chief judge authorizing an evidentiary hearing in a foreign country.6
The chief judge may, upon application of any party or upon his own initia-
tive, designate any three judges of the Customs Court to hear and determine
any cause of action which he finds raises an issue of the constitutionality of
an act of Congress, a proclamation of the President, or an executive order,
or has broad or significant implications in the administration or interpretation
of the customs laws.19
Prior to October 1, 1970, the effective date of the Customs Court Act of
1970," only cases involving the appraised value of imported merchandise were
United States, 39 C.C.P.A. 57 (1951); United States v. Good Neighbor Imports, Inc., 33
C.C.P.A. 91 (1945); United States v. Fred. Gretsch Mfg. Co., 28 C.C.P.A. 26 (1940).
" 19 U.S.C.A. § 1514 (Supp. 1971).
'
2 id. § 1516.
'318 U.S.C. §§ 541-52 (1966); 19 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (Supp. 1971); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1497,
1592 (1964).1419 U.S.C.A. §§ 1603, 1604 (Supp. 1971),
1128 id. §5 254, 2601.
16 Id. § 1541(b).17 Id.
1
8 1d. §§ 256, 1541(b).
191d. § 255.
"ePub. L. No. 91-271 (June 2, 1970) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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decided by a single judge, whose decision was subject to review, upon appeal
by either party, by a division of three judges assigned by the chief judge."'
All other cases, although usually heard by a single judge (unless the hearing
took place at New York City) were assigned by the chief judge to a division
of three judges specializing in the particular subject matter, whose decision was
final unless appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals."2
It cannot yet be determined whether the substantial elimination of three-
judge decisions will result in a significant increase in the number of appeals
to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, but it seems reasonable to assume
that this change, together with the elimination of specialization, will bring
about a lack of consistency in decisions of the Customs Court, which will in
itself tend to increase the number of appeals-both by the importer and by
the Government.
Judgments and orders of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are
final and conclusive unless modified, vacated, set aside, reversed, or remanded
by the Supreme Court.'
II. VALUATION FOR CUSTOMS PURPOSES
The law requires that imported merchandise be appraised by Customs. 4
This appraised value is material in determining the amount of duty to be
assessed if the imported merchandise is subject to a rate of duty which is
based upon or determined by its value; i.e., an ad valorem or compound rate,
or a specific rate determined by value."
An anomalous situation has existed with respect to customs valuation since
February 27, 1958, the effective date of the Customs Simplification Act of
1956.6 Prior to the enactment of this legislation it had long been recognized
that the valuation provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930,' as judicially con-
strued, were arbitrary and unrealistic in the light of normal commercial trans-
actions. Bills had been introduced, with the support of both the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations, designed to permit more flexibility in customs
valuation procedures and to bring them more into line with commercial reali-
ties. However, the proposed legislative reforms were strongly opposed by some
domestic industries who felt that they needed the additional protection afforded
by the unrealistically high customs appraisements required by existing law.
In order to resolve the impasse, a compromise was agreed upon. The Secretary
of the Treasury was directed to prepare and make public a list of those articles
which would be subject to appraisement under the new valuation provisions
"Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2636, 62 Stat. 980, 981, as amended, Act of May 24,
1949, ch. 139, § 122, 63 Stat. 106, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 254 (Supp. 1971).
22 Id.
"s28 U.S.C.A. § 26 01(c) (Supp. 1971).
1419 id. § 1500(b).
"1See, e.g., T.S.U.S.A. (1971), item 461.40, cosmetics and other toilet preparations,
not containing alcohol, 9% ad val. (ad valorem rate); T.S.U.S.A. (1971), item 461.45,
cosmetics and other toilet preparations containing alcohol, 9¢ per lb. and 9% ad val. (com-
pound rate); T.S.U.S.A. (1971), item 168.19, brandy, in containers each holding not over
1 gal., valued not over $9 per gal., 75¢ per gal. (specific rate dependent upon value).
"Act of Aug. 2, 1956, ch. 887, Pub. L. No. 84-927, 5 1, 2, 70 Star. 948 (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
" 19 U.S.C.A. 5 1402 (Supp. 1971), amending 19 U.S.C. 5 1402 (1964).
1971]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
at values five per cent or more lower than the values at which they were cur-
rently being appraised.28 All articles included in this list remained subject to
the existing valuation provisions; other articles became subject to the new
provisions on the thirtieth day following publication of the list, viz., February
27, 1958.9
This dual valuation system remains in effect, but decreases in imports of
the commodities on the "list" have reduced the percentage of imports subject to
appraisement under the "old law" to less than five per cent of total imports.
Nevertheless, the continued existence of the dual appraisement procedure cre-
ates confusion and uncertainty among importers and foreign exporters and
prevents the realistic appraisement of many commodities-for example, motor
vehicles, certain types of machines, and various chemicals.
A. The "Old Law"
A brief review of leading decisions construing the provisions of the "old"
valuation provisions 0 will illustrate the difficulties imposed upon foreign trade.
There are five bases of valuation provided by the "old law": foreign value,
export value, United States value, cost of production, and American selling
price. Merchandise subject to the "old law" is required to be appraised at
either foreign value or export value, whichever is higher, unless neither of
these values can be found, in which case United States value is used; if United
States value cannot be found, cost of production is used. American selling price
is used only with respect to commodities the subject of a presidential procla-
mation under the provisions of section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930,"1 based
upon a finding that existing tariff rates were insufficient to equalize differences
in costs of production. The only commodities currently subject to the Ameri-
can selling price basis of valuation are coal tar products, certain types of
rubber soled footwear, canned clams, and knit wool gloves and mittens valued
at not more than $1.75 per dozen pairs.
Foreign value is defined by the statute as the price at which such or similar
merchandise is freely offered for sale for home consumption to all purchasers
in the principal markets of the country of exportation, in the usual wholesale
quantities and in the ordinary course of trade."2 Export value is similarly de-
fined, except that it is the price at which such or similar merchandise is freely
offered to all purchasers for exportation to the United States."2 The language
which has given rise to the most difficulty in both definitions is "freely offered
for sale ... to all purchasers." This language has been construed by the courts
to require that the price found be offered to anyone wishing to purchase the
merchandise in the "usual wholesale quantities," without restriction as to re-
sale or use." As a result, the refusal of a manufacturer or wholesaler to sell
28Act of Aug. 2, 1956, ch. 887, Pub. L. No. 84-927, § 6(a), 70 Stat. 948.1 T.D. 54,521, 93 TREAS. DEC. 14 (1958).
8019 U.S.C. S 1402 (1964), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. S 1402 (Supp. 1971).
3119 U.S.C. § 1336 (1964).
82 19 U.S.C. § 1402(c) (1964), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. S 14 02(a) (Supp. 1971).
93 19 U.S.C. § 1402(d) (1964), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. 5 1402(a) (Supp. 1971).
3
4 Rico, Inc. v. United States, 48 C.C.P.A. 110 (1961); United States v. Graham &
Zenger, Inc., 31 C.C.P.A. 131 (1943); United States v. American Glantzstoff Corp., 24
C.C.P.A. 35 (1936); United States v. Richard & Co., 15 Ct. Cust. App. 143 (1927).
[Vol. 2 5
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to consumers has been considered a bar to a finding of foreign or export value.
In those cases where a manufacturer or other seller sells at different prices
to different classes of purchasers, such as distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and
consumers, the price to the least favored class of purchaser has been held to
represent statutory value, as being the only freely offered price.' This doctrine
frequently resulted in appraisement of imported merchandise at the price to
consumers, which was sometimes more than double the price to the United
States importer, who received the more favorable price to distributors or whole-
salers. In view of the common practice of manufacturers to limit sales to
selected purchasers, such as distributors or wholesalers, and the almost uniform
practice of charging higher prices when sales are made to retailers or con-
sumers, the totally unrealistic nature of this construction of the law is readily
apparent.
The added requirement that the merchandise be sold without restriction as
to resale or use prevented the finding of a foreign or export value in the case
of such usual and ordinary restrictions upon resale as designation of the terri-
tories in which purchasers were permitted to resell, or the fixing of resale
prices at one or more of the levels at which the merchandise was resold."
The foregoing difficulties were further compounded by the courts' interpre-
tation of the term "usual wholesale quantities," found in the statutory defini-
tions of both foreign value and export value, to mean the quantities in which
the major portion of sales were made."7 This interpretation frequently resulted
in merchandise being appraised at the price for very small quantities normally
sold to retailers or consumers, because the number of individual sales in such
quantities exceeded the number of individual sales in larger quantities to
wholesalers or distributors, even though the latter represented the great bulk
of the manufacturer's production. Thus, an importer buying in quantities of
10,000 units, at the established price for such quantities, might be required to
pay duty on the basis of the much higher price for twenty units, because this
was the quantity involved in the greatest number of individual sales.
As previously stated, the "old law" provides that if neither foreign nor ex-
port value can be found, United States value shall be the basis of appraise-
ment."8 United States value is defined by the statute as the price at which such
or similar imported merchandise is freely offered for sale for domestic con-
sumption in the United States, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the
ordinary course of trade, less duty, cost of transportation and insurance, and
other necessary expenses from the place of shipment to the place of delivery,
a commission not exceeding six per cent, if any has been paid or contracted to
be paid on goods secured otherwise than by purchase (e.g., goods consigned
to the United States for sale by a domestic representative of the foreign ship-
per), or profits not to exceed eight per cent and a reasonable allowance for
general expenses, not to exceed eight per cent, on goods secured by purchase."9
"eUnited States v. Glanson Co., 47 C.C.P.A. 110 (1960).
'Meadows Wye & Co. v. United States, 17 Ct. Cust. App. 36 (1929); Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. United States, 11 Ct. Cust. App. 351 (1922).3
"Pleissner v. United States, 16 Ct. Cust. App. 507 (1929).




It will be seen that the United States value formula is designed to arrive
at a value in the country of exportation by working back from the eventual
selling price of the imported merchandise in the United States. The courts'
interpretation of the terms "freely offered for sale ... to all purchasers" and
"usual wholesale quantities," as set forth above, require the application of the
same unrealistic standards in the case of appraisements on the basis of United
States value as in the case of appraisements on the basis of foreign or export
value. In addition, the arbitrary limitations on allowable deductions for com-
mission, or for profit and general expense, also led to unrealistic appraisements
in those instances in which the actual amounts significantly exceeded the
statutory limitations.
The residual basis of appraisement under the "old law" to be used when
neither foreign, export, nor United States value can be determined, is cost of
production." This is a formula for determining the market value of the im-
ported merchandise on the basis of the cost of manufacture, including appro-
priate additions for general expenses and profit. The statute again fixes arbi-
trary standards, in that a minimum of ten per cent must be added for general
expenses (manufacturing overhead), and a minimum of eight per cent for
profit. The addition for profit is further complicated by a requirement that it
must be equal to "the profit which ordinarily is added, in the case of merchan-
dise of the same general character as the particular merchandise under con-
sideration, by manufacturers or producers in the country of manufacture or
production who are engaged in the production or manufacture of merchandise
of the same class or kind."41 In spite of the obvious fact that it is virtually im-
possible for either an importer or his foreign supplier to establish the profit
realized by other manufacturers, the courts have uniformly held that a plain-
tiff seeking to establish cost of production must prove to the satisfaction of
the court that he exercised due diligence in an effort to secure evidence of the
profits realized by competing manufacturers in the country of exportation, and
that a mere routine inquiry is insufficient. 2 Adding to the difficulties faced by
importer-plaintiffs in cost-of-production cases is the fact that the courts have
never adequately defined the terms "same general character" or "same class
or kind." Consequently, it is sometimes most difficult to determine the cate-
gory of manufacturers of whom inquiry must be made to satisfy the require-
ment of due diligence. In the recent case of National Carloading Corp. v.
United States the appellate division of the Customs Court held, in a case in-
volving unfinished mica condensers, that the term "merchandise of the same
class or kind" was broad enough to require proof of the usual addition for
profit made by manufacturers of finished as well as unfinished condensers,
including condensers made of materials other than mica. 3 Although the decision
dealt with United States value, the principle laid down would also apply to
4019 U.S.C. § 1402(f) (1964), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1402(a) (Supp. 1971).
41 Id.
4 United States v. Perez, 36 C.C.P.A. 114, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949); United
States v. Maier, 21 C.C.P.A. 41 (1933); Ercona Camera Corp. v. United States, 56 Cust.
Ct. 811 (1966); United States v. Berben Corp., 49 Cust. Ct. 497 (1962).




cases involving cost of production. It seems obvious that this line of reasoning,
if applied to other articles produced in varying forms and of numerous ma-
terials, would make the plaintiff's burden of proof virtually impossible to meet.
B. The "New Law"
The Customs Simplification Act of 1956" was enacted in an attempt to
eliminate the more glaring inequities and conflicts with commercial realities
contained in the valuation provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930," as interpreted
by the courts. The new valuation provisions, or "new law" as they are com-
monly referred to, now apply to at least ninety-five per cent of all imports.
Following is a brief review of these provisions, noting the principal respects in
which they differ from the "old law."
There is no provision for foreign value in the "new law." This basis of
value was eliminated primarily because of the delays and difficulties involved
in its determination, a foreign investigation generally being required. In addi-
tion, the requirement in the "old law" that merchandise be appraised at foreign
or export value, whichever is higher, frequently resulted in unrealistically high
appraisements at home market prices applicable to quantities much smaller
than those exported to the United States, or even at home market prices to
retailers or consumers, by reason of the interpretation of the terms "freely
offered for sale ... to all purchasers" and "usual wholesale quantities," discussed
above.
Accordingly, the primary basis of appraisement under the "new law" is
export value." The definition of export value is similar to the definition of
this basis of value under the "old law," except that it is described as the price
"at which such or similar merchandise is freely sold or, in the absence of
sales, offered for sale in the principal markets of the country of exportation
- ..for exportation to the United States . . . ,"' rather than the price "at
which such or similar merchandise is freely offered for sale to all purchasers
in the principal markets of the country from which exported ... for exporta-
tion to the United States . 4...8 These changes were designed to give prece-
dence to sales over offers (which may be unrealistic or designed to create a
fictitious market), and to eliminate the difficulties which had arisen by reason
of the courts' interpretation of the term "all purchasers."
The changes in the definition of United States value are somewhat more
extensive. The most significant of these changes is the elimination of the
statutory limitation on deductions for commission, and for profit and general
expense. Provision instead is made for deduction of "any commission usually
paid or agreed to be paid, or the addition for profit and general expenses
usually made, in connection with sales .. .of imported merchandise of the
same class or kind ... ."" Unfortunately, the recent decision' of the Customs
Court in National Carloading will apparently greatly increase the difficulty
"Pub. L. No. 84-927, 70 Star. 948 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
419 U.S.C.A. § 1402 (Supp. 1971), amending 19 U.S.C. S 1402 (1964).





in meeting the burden of proof imposed upon the plaintiff in cases involving
United States value.
Another major change in the new definition of United States value is a
provision permitting appraisement on the basis of the price, with appropriate
deductions, at which the same or similar merchandise is sold or offered for
sale in the United States within ninety days after the date of exportation of
the merchandise undergoing appraisement. This is designed to avoid a technical
difficulty encountered in appraising merchandise on the basis of United States
value under the "old law," which required that "prototype merchandise," i.e.,
identical or similar merchandise exported from the same country, be offered or
sold in the United States at the time of exportation of the imported merchan-
dise under appraisement, thereby limiting this basis of value to merchandise
of a kind previously exported to the United States.
The residual basis of valuation in the "new law," to be used in the event
that neither export value nor United States value can be found, is constructed
value."0 It replaces the cost-of-production basis of valuation contained in the
"old law." It is similar to cost of production in that it is based upon the cost
of manufacture, including additions for general expenses and profit. Unlike
cost of production, however, there are no minimum additions for general
expenses and profit, but they must be equal to "that usually reflected in sales
of merchandise of the same general class or kind as the merchandise under-
going appraisement which are made by producers in the country of exporta-
tion ... for shipment to the United States."'" It will be seen that this change
narrows the burden of proof in one respect in that evidence of usual profit
need only be adduced with respect to those producers exporting to the United
States. But the burden is substantially broadened by the additional require-
ment of proof of usual general expenses added by such producers, and by
the change requiring that additions for general expenses and profit be based
upon sales of merchandise of the "same class or kind" rather than upon mer-
chandise of the "same general character" as required in the case of profit under
the "old law." This change is particularly significant in view of the court's
indication in National Carloading that the words "class or kind" have a
broader connotation than the words "same general character."" Accordingly,
it is doubtful that it can truly be said that the "new law" effected its intended
purpose of simplification insofar as the change from cost of production to
constructed value is concerned.
The "new law" also defined certain of the terms used in the statutory bases
of value," to avoid the further application of court decisions construing similar
provisions in previous statutes. Two of the terms so defined are "freely sold or
... offered for sale," and "usual wholesale quantities." As already noted, the
courts' interpretation of these terms had been a principal cause of the unrealistic
and inequitable customs valuations which eventually led to the enactment of
the Customs Simplification Act of 1956.'
"Id. § 1401a(d).
5Id.
" 5 Cust. Bull. No. 17, at 55.
'319 U.S.C. § 1401a(f) (1964).
'' Pub. L. No. 84-927, 70 Stat. 948 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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The term "freely sold or . . . offered for sale" is defined to mean sold or
offered to wholesalers or others who purchase for resale other than at retail,
or to industrial users; only in the absence of such sales are sales in usual whole-
sale quantities to retailers or other purchasers considered.55 It will be seen that
this eliminates the "least favored purchaser" concept which had frequently
led to appraisement at the price to retailers or even at the price to consumers
under the "old law."
The definition also permits appraisement at the price to "selected pur-
chasers," provided that such price "fairly reflects market value," and also allows
usual and ordinary restrictions, such as those limiting the price at which, or
the territory in which, the merchandise may be resold.' This provision was de-
signed to eliminate the unrealistic doctrine that any restriction with respect
to sales, offers, or resales negated the existence of a "freely offered" price.
"Usual wholesale quantities" is defined as the quantity or quantities in which
the greatest aggregate volume of the merchandise is sold, at a single price," a
far more realistic approach than the "major portion of sales" rule laid down
by the courts in interpreting the "old law."
Despite the considerable advantages of the "new law," as compared with
the previously existing valuation provisions, there is some ground for appre-
hension that its benefits may be eroded by a new line of court decisions. For
example, two recent decisions of the Customs Court, in cases involving a
selected purchaser, have taken the position that the plaintiff must introduce
evidence as to the prices charged by other manufacturers of the same merchan-
dise in the exporting country, in order to establish that the prices paid by him
"fairly reflect market value."5 This could often be an insuperable burden
since competent evidence of the prices of competitors is usually difficult or
impossible to obtain.
Although there is no doubt that, in the interests of equity and commercial
reality, the valuation provisions of the new law could be further simplified,
the existing protectionist climate in Congress and throughout the country
makes such action extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future. The most
pressing need is, of course, complete repeal of the "old law," to end the
anomalous and confusing situation in which imports are being valued under
two different statutes.
III. CLASSIFICATION (RATES OF DUTY)
The rates of duty applicable to imported merchandise are set forth in the
Tariff Schedules of the United States (T.S.U.S.), published by the Tariff Com-
mission. The T.S.U.S. was originally compiled by the Tariff Commission pur-
suant to title I of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954, which directed the
Commission: (1) to make a comprehensive study of the tariff status of
imports and to submit to the President and to Congress a revision and con-
5 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(f) (1) (1964).
5 8 d.
" ld. § 1401a (f) (5).
"8Judson Sheldon Int'l Corp. v. United States, 4 Cust. Bull. No. 29, at 7 (Cust. Ct.
1970), appealed, 4 Cust. Bull. No. 47, at 80 (Cust. Ct. 1970); American Hydrolan Corp.
v. United States, 4 Cust. Bull. No. 22, at 97 (Cust. Ct. 1970).
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solidation of those laws; (2) to establish schedules of tariff classification logical
in arrangement and terminology, adapted to changes which had occurred since
enactment of the Tariff Act of 1930; and (3) to eliminate anomalies and
illogical results and simplify the determination and application of tariff
classification. " These schedules were enacted into law pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962,"° and became effective on
August 31, 1963. The T.S.U.S. is kept up to date by the Tariff Commission
by publication at frequent intervals of supplements and revised schedules
reflecting changes in rates of duty.
Since the T.S.U.S. contains several thousand different commodity descrip-
tions, each subject to a different rate of duty or, in some instances, free of duty,
it is obvious that a detailed study of court decisions relating to classification
would require several volumes. This discussion will accordingly be limited to
a review of the broad general principles set forth in the law or established by
judicial precedent.
Before examining these general principles, it should be noted that the
T.S.U.S. sets forth two separate rates of duty for each commodity enumerated.
The rates set forth in column 1 apply generally to all imports, with the ex-
ception of products of Communist countries other than Poland and Yugo-
slavia." Those in column 2 apply to the products of Communist countries
(other than Poland and Yugoslavia), and are the rates originally provided in
the Tariff Act of 1930 (with subsequent statutory changes). They do not
reflect modifications in rates of duty proclaimed pursuant to trade negotiations
with other countries." Such modifications, which are reflected in the rates set
forth in column 1, were negotiated and proclaimed pursuant to authority
granted by various acts of Congress." Such trade negotiations are conducted
within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), to which the United States became a signatory in 1947.4
It is a long-standing rule of tariff classification that tariff statutes are drafted
in the language of commerce, and that the commercial meaning is presumed
to be the same as the common meaning unless a different commercial desig-
nation is established.' Common meaning is a matter of law to be determined
by the court, for which purpose the court may consult dictionaries and other
authorities, may receive the testimony of witnesses, which is advisory only,
and may rely upon its own knowledge." In order to establish a commercial
meaning of a tariff term different from the common meaning, it must be
shown that at the time of enactment of the provision in question the precise
tariff term had a definite, uniform, and general meaning in the trade and
commerce of the United States which was different from its common meaning."7
"Pub. L. No. 83-768, 68 Stat. 1136.
"
0 Pub. L. No. 87-456, 76 Stat. 72.
"8T.S.U.S.A., General Headnote 3 (1971).
62 Id.
6' 19 U.S.C. §5 1351-54, 1360-61, 1366 (1964).
"
4 T.D. 51802, 82 TREAS. DEc. 305 (1947).
" Hummel Chem. Co. v. United States, 29 C.C.P.A. 178, 183 (1941).
"United States v. Victoria Gin Co., 48 C.C.P.A. 33, 35 (1960).
"United States v. Fung Chong Co.. 34 C.C.P.A. 40, 42 (1946); United States v. Julius
Wile Sons, 22 C.C.P.A. 267, 269 (1934); United States v. Wilfred Shade & Co., 16 Ct.
Cust. App. 366, 370 (1928).
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It has also been a well-settled rule that in determining which of two or
more different tariff provisions governs the classification of an imported article,
a use provision prevails over an eo nomine provision, in the absence of a
clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary. 8 Such contrary intent
has been held to be shown by a competing eo nomine provision which pre-
cisely and specifically describes the merchandise."
A tariff provision controlled by use is determined in accordance with the
use in the United States at, or immediately prior to, the date of importation
of articles of that class or kind to which the imported articles belong, and the
controlling use is the chief use--,e., the use which exceeds all other uses
(if any) combined." Chief use must be "established on the basis of positive
testimony representative of an adequate geographical cross section of the
nation."7'
Imported articles not more specifically provided for elsewhere in the T.S.U.S.
are frequently classified according to the material of which they are composed.
Although such tariff descriptions sometimes provide for articles composed
"wholly or in chief value of" a specified material and sometimes for articles
"of" a specified material, an article must in both instances be composed wholly
or in chief value of the named material if it is to be covered by the provision
in question." On the other hand, tariff descriptions covering articles "in part
of" or "containing" a named material merely require that the article contain
a significant part of the named material."
The courts have held that the proper method for determining component
material of chief value is to ascertain the cost of the separate parts or com-
ponent materials to the manufacturer at the time they are in such condition
that nothing remains to be done to them except to combine them to make the
completed article.' This rule is applicable only if the component materials, at
the time they are joined together, are in the same condition as in the com-
pleted article, which is usually the case. If they are changed in condition after
joining together, the general rule does not apply, and their value must be
determined in the form in which they appear in the completed article." For
example, in a case involving woven fabrics composed of linen, nylon, and wool
fibers, which were spun together into a single yarn before being woven into
fabric, it was held that spinning costs must be added to the cost of the fibers
in order to determine the component material of chief value."'
"United States v. S.H. Kress & Co., 46 C.C.P.A. 135, 137 (1959); United States v.
Lansen-Naeve Corp., 44 C.C.P.A. 31 (1957); M. Pressner & Co. v. United States, 42
C.C.P.A. 48, 50 (1954).
" United States v. Lansen-Naeve Corp., 44 C.C.P.A. 31 (1957); Drakenfeld & Co. v.
United States, 9 Ct. Cust. App. 124 (1919); United States v. Snow's United States Sample
Express Co., 6 Ct. Cust. App. 120, 127 (1915); Drakenfeld & Co. v. United States, 2 Ct.
Cust. App. 512 (1912).7 0T.S.U.S.A., General Headnote 10(e)(i) (1971).
" L. Tobert Co. v. United States, 41 C.C.P.A. 161, 164 (1953).
7 2 T.S.U.S.A., General Headnote 9(f) (1971).
73 Id.
'United States v. H.A. Caesar & Co., 32 C.C.P.A. 142 (1945); United States v. Rice
Stix Dry Goods Co., 19 C.C.P.A. 232 (1931); United States v. Bernard, Judae & Co., 15
Ct. Cust. App. 172 (1927).
' United States v. Perez, 44 C.C.P.A. 35 (1957).
70 N. Erlanger Blumgart v. United States, 428 F.2d 860, 862 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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Various provisions for "parts" of certain named articles have long been the
source of much confusion and litigation. Prior to the enactment into law of
the T.S.U.S., the prevailing rule for determining whether an article should be
classified as a "part" of another named article was whether it had been ad-
vanced to a point which dedicated it for use as a part of that article."' An
imported article which was commercially suitable and commercially used as
a part of several different articles was held to be not a part of any of them
and had to be classified elsewhere in the tariff provisions." As a consequence
very similar articles were sometimes subject to widely varying rates of duty,
depending upon whether it was determined that, in their imported condition,
they were "dedicated" for use as a part of a specific manufacture."'
In an effort to eliminate such inconsistencies, the general headnotes of the
T.S.U.S. state that "a provision for 'parts' of an article covers a product solely
or chiefly used as a part of such article, but does not prevail over a specific
provision for such part.""0 It will be noted that this requires all "parts"
specifically provided for by name in any item of the T.S.U.S. to be classified
at the rate so provided, regardless of whether any of them are "dedicated" for
use as a part of a specific article. Further, as a consequence of this change, an
import may be classified as a part of a specific article if it is chiefly so used,
even though it may occasionally be used as a part of other articles.
Another general classification principle of some interest is that relating to
"entireties." This principle was defined by the United States Court of Customs
Appeals as follows:
[If an importer brings into the country, at the same time, certain parts,
which are designed to form, when joined or attached together, a complete
article of commerce, and when it is further shown that the importer intends
to so use them, these parts will be considered for tariff purposes as entireties,
even though they may be unattached or enclosed in separate packages, and
even though said parts might have a commerical value and be salable sepa-
rately.81
Parts of an article which are imported in the same shipment, and which are
deemed to be entireties under the above rule, are classified for duty purposes
at the rate applicable to the article in its assembled condition. Examples of
separate parts which have been held to be entireties include: corsets and lace
trimmings imported in equal numbers with a label on each piece of trimming
indicating a number and size which correspond to one of the corsets;" earthen-
ware teapots and coffee pots, imported with felt-lined metal cozies which
"Worthington v. Robbinis, 139 U.S. 337 (1891); United States v. Schenkers, Inc.,
17 C.C.P.A. 231 (1929); United States v. National Importing Co., 12 Ct. Cust. App. 186(1924); United States v. Lyon & Healy, 4 Ct. Cust. App. 438 (1913); Athenia Steel &
Wire Co. v. United States, 1 Ct. Cust. App. 494 (1911).
" United States v. Ford Motor Co., 51 C.C.P.A. 22 (1963).
78Gallagher & Ascher Co. v. United States, 52 C.C.P.A. 11 (1964); United States v.
Pompeo, 43 C.C.P.A. 9, 11 (1955); United States v. Willoughby Camera Stores, 21 C.C.P.A.
322, 324 (1933); Lodge Spark Plug Co. v. United States, 49 Cust. Ct. 158 (1962); Davies
Turner & Co. v. United States, 13 Cust. Ct. 190, 198-99 (1944).80 T.S.U.S.A., General Headnote 10(i) (j) (1971).
8 1 Altman & Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Cust. App. 315, 316 (1925).82 1d.
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covered each pot;' "cabana sets" consisting of tops and shorts, matched as to
color, print, and fabric, imported and sold as a unit; 4 hooded parkas with
braided drawstrings around the hood.85
Nevertheless, it should be noted that additional replacement parts imported
with the article to which they relate are not considered an entirety with such
article. As an example, a marking pen imported with three cartridges was
held classifiable as an entirety only with one of such cartridges. The remaining
two cartridges were held separately dutiable as "[r]efill cartridges.""
An interesting corollary to the entireties principle is the fact that an im-
porter can avoid its application, if he should choose to do so, by the simple
expedient of importing the parts in separate shipments. This is in no sense an
evasion of the tariff statute, but a perfectly legal alternative. It is a basic
principle that an importer may fashion his merchandise in any manner which
will subject it to the lowest rate of duty."
Even the foregoing brief review of basic classification principles fully indi-
cates the hazards faced by an importer who attempts to determine the rate of
duty applicable to merchandise he contemplates importing by consulting the
tariff schedules and finding a description which he believes to be appropriate.
In recognition of this problem the Bureau of Customs has provided that an
importer may obtain a binding opinion on the classification of a prospective
import by submitting a written application to the Commissioner of Customs
with a complete description of the article, accompanied by a sample, if practic-
able. "
IV. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
Among other subjects falling within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court
is litigation with respect to the statutes relating to the imposition of dumping
and countervailing duties, as these statutes involve charges or exactions within
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury."8
The Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended," provides for the imposition
of special dumping duties when imported merchandise is sold in the United
States at less than its fair value and, as a result, an industry in the United
States is injured, is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established.
The determination of whether imported merchandise is being sold at less
than its fair value is made by the Secretary of the Treasury, while the determi-
nation of injury is made by the Tariff Commission. If both determinations are
in the affirmative, the statute requires the Secretary of the Treasury to publish
"eMarks v. United States, 28 Cust. Ct. 98, 103 (1952).
"
4 Miniature Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 54 C.C.P.A. 11 (1966).
85 Shalom Baby Wear, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cust. Bull. No. 42, at 23 (1970).
88 John K. Kealy Co. v. United States, 4 Cust. Bull. No. 8, at 38 (1970).
87Seeberger v. Farwell, 139 U.S. 608 (1891); Merritt v. Walsh, 104 U.S. 694 (1891);
Michaelian & Kohlberg, Inc. v. United States, 22 C.C.P.A. 551, 557 (1935); Lang v. United
States, 10 Ct. Cust. App. 228 (1920).
88 19 C.F.R. § 16 .10a(a) (b) (1971).
8828 U.S.C.A. § 1582(a) (3) (Supp. 1971), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964).




a finding of dumping, subjecting importations of the merchandise in question
to special dumping duties. 1 Such duties are normally in an amount equal to
the difference between the price paid by the United States importer and the
price at which the same or similar merchandise is sold to purchasers at the
same level in the country of exportation. They are imposed in addition to any
regular duties.
Appraisements under the Antidumping Act-i.e., determination of the
prices used as the basis for the assessment of special dumping duties-may be
protested by the importer in the same manner as regular appraisements. But
since the discretion granted customs officials to determine values under the
Antidumping Act is much broader than in the case of normal valuation for
customs purposes, the burden of proof is almost insurmountable. As a conse-
quence few dumping appraisements are protested. Challenges to determinations
of sales at less than fair value made by the Secretary of the Treasury, or to
determinations of injury by the Tariff Commission, have likewise met with
little success. The courts have held that the judicial power of review extends
only to a determination of whether the Secretary or the Commission proceeded
in the manner prescribed by statute in reaching their respective findings, and
that the courts are without authority to review the facts to determine the
correctness of the conclusions reached."
The countervailing duty statute provides that:
[Wlhenever any country .. .or other political subdivision .. .shall pay or
bestow ... any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or ex-
port of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country
... or other political subdivision .... and such article or merchandise is duti-
able under the provisions of this Act, then upon the importation of any such
article or merchandise into the United States, . . .there shall be levied and
paid .. .an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant
.... The Secretary of the Treasury shall from time to time ascertain and
determine, or estimate, the net amount of each such bounty or grant .... "
The courts have held that the Secretary's finding of the existence of a
bounty or grant may be reviewed to determine whether it was supported by
substantial evidence." A recent decision by the Customs Court went a step
farther and held that the court, upon the filing of an American manufacturer's
protest against the refusal of the Secretary to find that a bounty or grant was
being paid upon litharge imported from Mexico, had jurisdiction to direct the
imposition of countervailing duties in an amount to be determined by the
Secretary. " The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed,
stating that "the determination that a bounty or grant is paid necessarily in-
" 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
92Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (C.C.P.A. 1963); Kleberg
& Co. v. United States, 21 C.C.P.A. 110, 115 (1933).
19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1964).
" Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United
States, 53 C.C.P.A. 36, 40 (1966); V. Mueller & Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354, 360
(C.C.P.A. 1940); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348 (C.C.P.A. 1940);
Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97, 98 (1916), af'd, 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
"5Hammond Lead Products, Inc. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 460 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
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volves judgments in the political, legislative, or policy spheres," and held that
the Customs Court lacked jurisdiction."6
V. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER REMEDIAL LEGISLATION
Although the legislative changes affecting value and classification have
modernized customs procedures and brought them more into line with com-
mercial realities, there remains a great deal of room for improvement. Valua-
tion statutes remain arbitrary and unrealistic in many respects, and the in-
numerable rates of duty are a source of confusion even to experts in this field.
The Tariff Commission, at the request of the Committee on Finance of the
United States Senate, has instituted a study of the customs valuation procedures
of foreign countries and the United States with a view to developing and sug-
gesting uniform standards of customs valuation which would operate fairly
among all classes of shippers in international trade, and of the economic effects
which would follow if the United States were to adopt such standards of
valuation. Regardless of the outcome of this study, it can be expected that any
legislation designed to further simplify valuation procedures will be stoutly
resisted by those who feel that they have a vested interest in any legislative
provision tending to impede imports.
With respect to classification provisions, any effort to reduce or simplify
the existing multitudinous rates of duty will be most difficult, for two reasons:
( 1 ) the fact that most of such rates are based upon trade agreements to which
the United States is committed under the provisions of GATT; and (2) oppo-
sition by domestic groups to any simplification that might result in a reduction
of the rates of duty applicable to imports which are competitive with their
products.
Perhaps the most frequently advanced suggestion is that the United States
should adopt the "Brussels Nomenclature."97 This is a compilation of tariff
descriptions compiled by the Customs Cooperation Council, an international
organization with headquarters at Brussels, of which the United States re-
cently became a member. It was originally designed to enable the Common
Market nations to adopt a uniform system of tariff phraseology, but has since
been adopted by virtually all of the other major trading nations except the
United States. The principal difficulty which would arise from its adoption,
in addition to those set forth above, would be the fact that most of the legal
precedents, built up over more than a century, would become largely obsolete.
It must accordingly be concluded that the prospects for any early, substantial
improvement in customs valuation or classification procedures are not en-
couraging.
"United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., Civil Nos. 5392-5393 (C.C.P.A.,
Apr. 22, 1971).
"' CUSTOMS COOPERATION COUNCIL, NOMENCLATURE FOR THE CLASSIFICATION
OF GOODS IN CUSTOMS TARIFFS (1955).
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